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In this paper, we study the law and economics of cyber risk pooling arrange-
ments: risk sharing without an insurer. We start our discussion with the
current theoretical foundations for risk shifting in cyber security. We subse-
quently discuss cyber risk pooling in relation to individual risk management
and cyber insurance. This leads to the formulation of conditions for effective
risk pooling in cyber security. We show that pooling, under some circum-
stances, may be more effective than cyber insurance. The main question for
future research is whether risk pools in cyber security are capable of compart-
mentalization of risks and whether transaction costs of monitoring can be
kept sufficiently low.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early days of mankind, risk sharing was a rudimen-
tary form of insurance. If someone’s vessel was destroyed,
neighbors committed to help rebuild it, while at the same
time, the owner of the vessel committed to rebuild the neigh-
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bor’s vessel in case of destruction.1 This paper takes us back to
these forms of risk sharing by examining the concept of cyber
risk sharing, also called “pooling.” Cyber risk pooling is risk
sharing without the interference of an insurer. The concept
has received limited attention in the cyber security literature.
We aim to contribute to the literature by examining the theo-
retical potential of cyber risk pooling and by distinguishing the
conditions for pooling in order to work in cyber security.
We start the discussion in Part I with the theoretical foun-
dations for risk shifting in cyber security. We subsequently dis-
cuss its implications for two traditional risk allocation struc-
tures: individual risk management and cyber insurance. When
risk allocation changes, incentives for using or obtaining infor-
mation in order to make socially efficient cyber security invest-
ment decisions change.2 We show that neither individual risk
management nor cyber insurance offer perfect incentives for
managing capricious risks in cyber security. The last part of
this section will introduce cyber risk pooling as a third risk al-
location structure. In Part II, we analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of risk pooling relative to individual risk manage-
ment and cyber insurance. Part III addresses earlier exper-
iences with risk sharing, and in Part IV, we summarize condi-
tions for effective risk sharing in cyber security. In Part V, we
concretize specific design parameters of a pooling arrange-
ment. We show which design choices should be made in order
to fulfill the conditions of an effective risk sharing agreement.
We also distinguish the main trade-offs in such a design.
I.
RISK ALLOCATION IN CYBER SECURITY
With respect to cyber security, the actor exposed to the
risk has incentives to manage it towards its own private opti-
1. MIRAN JUS, CREDIT INSURANCE 7 (2013). Risk sharing was already ap-
plied between various operators in the middle ages exposed to similar risk.
See Göran Skogh, Risk-Sharing and Insurance: Contracts with Different Institu-
tional Implications, in INTERNATIONALISIERUNG DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONO-
MISCHE ANALYSE: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG
275, 297–305 (Thomas Eger et al. eds., 2008).
2. Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, Information Security Economics – and
Beyond, Presented at the ninth International Conference on Deontic Logic
in Computer Science (2008).
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mum because he will bear the costs of cyber insecurity.3 Be-
cause exposure to cyber security risk changes in the three risk
allocation structures, the structure of risk allocation deter-
mines the incentive organizations have in making socially de-
sirable investment decisions.4 Accordingly, the first aim of this
paper is to identify the effects of the three types of risk alloca-
tion structures on the incentives of stakeholders involved in
reducing the risks related to cyber security. Traditionally, two
types of risk allocation structures are taken into consideration
by scholars in cyber security, namely, individual management
by the individual firm5 and the (partial) transfer of risk to an
insurer in the form of cyber insurance.6 In this part, we will
address these two alternatives in light of their ability to shift
risk in an effective manner in cyber security, and stress the
need for exploring a third way of managing cyber risks,
namely by sharing them amongst firms without the interfer-
ence of an insurer.
A. Risk Shifting
Before addressing these three alternatives for risk shifting,
it should be addressed why a demand for risk shifting is cre-
ated in the first place and why risk shifting may be socially ben-
eficial. In the literature, two foundations for risk shifting are
distinguished. The first—the most traditional economic ap-
proach—is to consider risk shifting as a remedy for risk aver-
sion.7 Individuals (and institutions) may have an aversion to
risks with a low probability of occurrence but a high degree of
potential damage.8 Given wealth restraints and the limited
marginal utility of increasing wealth, individuals suffer disutil-
3. Xia Zhao, Ling Xue & Andrew B. Whinston, Managing Interdependent
Information Security Risks: Cyberinsurance, Managed Security Services, and Risk
Pooling Arrangements, 30 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 123, 126–27 (2013).
4. Id.
5. Brent Rowe & Michael Gallaher, Private Sector Cyber Security Investment
Strategies: An Empirical Analysis, Presented at the fifth Workshop on the Eco-
nomics of Information Security (WEIS) 2006.
6. Christian Biener, Martin Eling & Jan Hendrik Wirfs, Insurability of
Cyber Risk: An Empirical Analysis, 40 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INSURANCE 131,
134–35 (2015).
7. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
258–59 (1st ed. 2004).
8. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 281 (1979).
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ity from the risk of being exposed to the possibility of losing a
large amount of wealth. Since risk aversion creates disutility
for individuals and organizations, social welfare increases if
risk is removed from individuals with risk aversion.9 However,
the degree of risk aversion depends not just on the type and
the size of the risk, but more particularly on the wealth of the
individual concerned.10 For example, an individual who only
possesses C= 50,000 may be highly averse to a 1% risk of losing
C= 100,000. However, if the same individual possesses several
million euro, there would be no risk aversion, and hence no
demand to hedge particular risks. This starting point is quite
important as it explains that the demand for risk shifting by
firms exposed to cyber security will depend upon the type of
risk (low probability, high damage, or rather, the reverse) and
on the individual wealth situation of the firm concerned.
Therefore, the demand for risk shifting will be high in a
situation where the risk to which the firm is exposed is rela-
tively high (in the sense that a high level of damage can occur
when the risk materializes) and when the individual wealth of
the firm is limited. The latter may more particularly be the
case when the potential damage would be greater than the
wealth of the firm if the risk materializes. This simple eco-
nomic logic is also related to the fact that risk shifting is not a
costless exercise.11 Therefore, a willingness to pay for risk shift-
ing will only occur in cases of risk aversion: where the risk is
relatively high (i.e., high damage will ensue if the risk material-
izes) and where firms lack the resources to sustain the risk.
This also shows that the attitude to risk and the related de-
mand for risk shifting is not binary (in the sense of all or noth-
ing), but has a gradual nature. The latter may more particu-
larly be important since some techniques of dealing with risk
(like individual risk management) have lower costs than
others (insurance, for example).
It should, however, be stressed that other justifications for
corporate insurance other than risk aversion have also been
identified in the literature. Mayers and Smith indicated that
the corporate form provides an effective hedge since it allows
9. SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 259.
10. Luigi Guiso & Monica Paiella, Risk Aversion, Wealth, and Background
Risk, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1109, 1122 (2008).
11. Biener, Eling & Wirfs, supra note 6, at 144–45.
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shareholders to eliminate risk through investment in a diversi-
fied portfolio.12 Since risk reduction is not considered as the
most obvious basis for a specific demand for insurance by cor-
porations, Mayers and Smith identify a few other reasons for
corporations to demand insurance.13 One possibility is that
corporate insurance contracts allow an allocation of risk to the
claimholders of the firm who have a comparative advantage in
risk-bearing;14 insurance may also lower the expected transac-
tion costs of bankruptcy and provide real service efficiencies in
claims administration.15 Also other authors have advanced rea-
sons for risk-shifting (more particularly via insurance), other
than risk-aversion.
For example, it has been argued that insurance could re-
duce information and transaction costs. Operators often wish
to benefit from services offered by insurance companies that
can reduce transaction costs. Insurers offer the service of ad-
ministrating claims at much lower cost than corporations
would face if claims were to be administered in-house.16 This is
related to the specialization of insurers in claims handling, but
also to economies of scale.17 The advantage for traders is that
the contractual conditions in the insurance policy (aiming at
the reduction of moral hazard) in fact replace the need for
traders to contract in detail, for example, concerning the allo-
cation of risk.18 This explains why there is a demand for risk
shifting by actors who suffer no risk aversion as well.19
The actors that seek risk shifting in the case of cyber se-
curity are mostly commercial operators and not individuals.20
12. David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith Jr., On the Corporate Demand for In-
surance, 55 J. BUS. 281, 282 (1982).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 283–84.
15. Id. at 284–86.
16. Göran Skogh, The Transactions Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting Im-
pediments and Costs, 56 J. RISK & INS. 726, 727 (1989).
17. See J. David Cummins, Economies of Scale in Independent Insurance Agen-
cies, 44 J. RISK & INS. 539 (1977).
18. See id.
19. Michael Faure & Donatella Porrini, Göran Skogh on Risk Sharing and
Environmental Policy, 42 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 177, 180 (2017).
20. See, e.g., Julie Zhu, Greater China Cyber Insurance Demand Set to Soar After
WannaCry Attack: AIG, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.businessin
sider.com/r-greater-china-cyber-insurance-demand-set-to-soar-after-wanna
cry-attack-aig-2017-8?international=true&r=US&IR=T.
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As opposed to individuals, corporate actors are often assumed
to be relatively risk neutral, especially when they are well-capi-
talized.21 However, as will be shown below, there may be a de-
mand for shifting cyber risks—even for corporate actors—pre-
cisely due to the specific characteristics of cyber security risks.
B. Problems in Shifting Cyber Risks
Assuming that organizations have a demand for shifting
cyber risks, the question arises as to whether the particular fea-
tures of cyber risks are conducive to such risk shifting. Exter-
nalities and informational problems, two classic examples of
market failures, may arise.22
First, externalities cause the costs or benefits of an invest-
ment decision to be imposed upon a third party, and thus the
party investing does not take into account the full cost or ben-
efit of its decision.23 For instance, when an organization’s com-
puter systems are infected by malicious software that secretly
makes them part of a botnet, its systems will be used to execute
large-scale attacks against other systems.24 However, it is in the
interest of the person behind the botnet operation to let the
initial infection go unnoticed so that the owner of the system
will not be prompted to remove the malicious code. The
botnet system thus does not even rise to the level of nuisance
for the owner of the infected computer. Hence, the benefits of
removal of this software belong only to society, which will ex-
perience, ceteris paribus, fewer botnet attacks, while the pri-
vate owner of the initially infected system incurs the costs of
detection and removal of the malicious code but few benefits.
This poses a problem for society, because there is no incentive
for the private owner to remove the malicious code or even
21. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88
J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Mark E. Parry & Arthur E. Parry, The Purchase of
Insurance by a Risk-Neutral Firm for a Risk-Averse Agent, 58 J. RISK & INS. 30
(1991); Agnar Sandmo, On the Theory of the Competitive Firm Under Price Uncer-
tainty, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 65 (1971).
22. See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Francis Bator, The Anat-
omy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 356–63 (1958).
23. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. ECON. 141 (1979).
24. Michel van Eeten et al., The Role of Internet Service Providers in Botnet
Mitigation: An Empirical Analysis Based on Spam Data 3 (OECD Sci. Tech. &
Industry Working Paper No. 2010/5, 2010).
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install programs or otherwise make an effort to detect the in-
fection in the first place.25 On the other hand, there are also
situations wherein the costs of security investment are borne
by society, while the benefits are experienced primarily by the
private organization. In economic terms: the private invest-
ments in risk reduction have an effect on society. But because
the private actor cannot internalize these, those risk-reducing
actions may not ultimately be taken.
Second, there are informational problems in the cyber
market, such as the lack of reliable data about cyber risks and
the lack of information about the return on investment for in-
vestments in cyber security.26 The lack of reliable data is a re-
sult of the fact that both the type and impact of cyber threats
change continuously and it is hard or impossible to forecast
future impact based on past data. For example, in recent years,
cyber security experts observed a giant spike in ransomware.27
Ransomware is a malicious piece of software that takes a com-
puter “hostage,” in the sense that the owner cannot access the
computer before a certain kind of ransom is paid, usually in
the form of a digital currency such as Bitcoin.28 Thus, long-
term data about the frequency of occurrence and average
damage is unavailable. Consequently, parties have difficulty in
determining proper security measures. This stands in stark
contrast to internet banking fraud, which declined sharply in the
Netherlands after banks undertook effective security measures
and is no longer an issue.29
25. Michel van Eeten & Johannes Bauer, Economics of Malware: Security
Decisions, Incentives and Externalities 58 (OECD Sci. Tech. & Industry Working
Paper No. 2008/1, 2008).
26. See SHAVELL, supra note 7; MARTIN ELING & WERNER SCHNELL, GENEVA
ASS’N, TEN QUESTIONS ON CYBER RISK AND CYBER RISK INSURANCE (Fabian
Sommerrock ed., 2016).
27. See, e.g., Alex Hern, Ransomware Threat on the Rise as ‘Almost 40% of
Businesses Attacked,’ THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/03/ransomware-threat-on-
the-rise-as-40-of-businesses-attacked.
28. Alexandre Gazet, Comparative Analysis of Various Ransomware Virii, 6 J.
COMPUTER VIROLOGY 77 (2010).
29. Total damage of Internet banking fraud in the Netherlands declined
sharply from, C= 4.7 million in 2014 and C= 3.7 million in 2015 to C= 148,000 in
the first half of 2016. This contrasts with the figures that were measured
when Internet Banking Fraud was at the height of its impact in the first half
of 2012, when there was C= 24.7 million damage. See Hoe Hoog is De Schade Door
Fraude Met Internetbankieren?, NEDERLANDSE VERENIGING VAN BANKEN, https://
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Botnets, ransomware and internet banking fraud are just three
examples of cyber risks that are characterized by externalities
and informational problems. As we will show, these features of
cyber risk compromise the possibility of risk shifting, especially
as when it comes to the traditional instrument of insurance.
C. Cyber Insurance
Insurance is a technique which provides cover against risk
through the (partial) transfer of risks to a third party in return
for a premium. However, the premium paid to an insurer will
often be substantially higher than the objective value of the
risk (the probability multiplied by the damage).30 One reason
for this phenomenon is that insurers may add a risk premium
to account for uncertainty or insurer ambiguity.31 An alterna-
tive reason is that insurers may engage in what is referred to as
“loading,” in which they charge a premium to help cover the
high transaction costs required to operate insurance compa-
nies.32 This too explains the gradual nature of the demand
curve for insurance: where risk aversion is high, the firm may
still have a demand for insurance (even though the premium
is higher than the objective value of the risk). If the risks are
not assessed extremely highly, the firm may not have a de-
mand for insurance, or may only have a demand to cover
higher levels of risk.
In addition to providing a remedy for risk aversion, insur-
ance may also be advantageous for providing the insurer with
increased knowledge of efficient investments in cyber security,
which it can then transfer to the insured for their mutual ben-
efit. Insurers can benefit from economies of scale in acquiring
information on cyber risks.33 Insurers are able to do this when
they have large time window available or are able to aggregate
www.nvb.nl/veelgestelde-vragen/veiligheid-fraude/1816/hoe-hoog-is-de-sch
ade-door-fraude-met-Internetbankieren.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2018);
Fraude met internetbankieren ‘spectaculair gedaald’, FINANCIEEL DAGBLAD (Sept.
15, 2016), https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1167515/fraude-met-internet
banken-spectaculair-gedaald.
30. Robin Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Ambiguity and Insurance Deci-
sions, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 386, 386–89 (1985).
31. Id. at 388.
32. See, e.g., Eric Briys, On the Theory of Rational Insurance Purchasing in a
Continuous-Time Model, 47 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 165, 171–74 (1988).
33. Biener, Eling & Wirfs, supra note 6, at 141.
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claim data. By linking premiums to the care level of the in-
sured, insurers incentivize increased care levels of information
technology security.34
A general problem which often emerges in insuring
against relatively new risks is that insurance companies may
lack sufficient information to correctly calculate so-called “ac-
tuarially fair premiums,” which is, as previously mentioned, a
particular problem for cyber risks.35 For example, they may
suffer from insurer ambiguity and as a result charge a rela-
tively high risk premium.36 If the potentially insured firm per-
ceives this risk premium as excessive, supply and demand will
not meet. That is the situation where a risk is considered unin-
surable. This danger is more likely to occur with newly emerg-
ing risks. With new risks, insurers often lack information and
will therefore prudently charge (relatively high) risk premi-
ums which may be considered excessive by the individual firm.
As a result, the market for insurance for newly emerging risks
is often difficult.37 It is precisely for that reason (i.e., insurers
lacking information concerning new risks) that risk sharing by
operators may be relatively attractive.38 Sometimes operators
themselves may have better information on the relative nature
of the risk than insurers.
Thus, cyber insurance could in theory enable risk shifting,
provided there is sufficient information to calculate risks.
However, empirical observations show that the market has not
yet fully developed, precisely because of the lack of past data,
the high premiums that ensue, hard to unravel policies and
insufficient awareness among the public. The present cyber in-
surance market also seems to struggle with a particular feature
of cyber security risks which endangers insurability: correlated
risks and cascade effects caused by the interconnectedness of
IT-systems.39
34. Id. at 145.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Howerd Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth & Jacqueline Meszaros, Insurer
Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 79–83 (1993).
37. MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYS-
TEMIC RISKS 85–87 (1st ed. 2003).
38. Göran Skogh & Hong Wu, The Diversification Theorem Restated: Risk-
pooling Without Assignment of Probabilities, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (2005).
39. Biener, Eling & Wirfs, supra note 6, at 13; Bernold Nieuwesteeg,
Louis Visscher & Bob de Waard, The Law and Economics of Cyber Insurance
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Cyber insurance products have emerged on the market in
the early 2000s.40 Currently, around 10% of European firms
have purchased cyber insurance, and this number is probably
an order of magnitude lower for small and medium-sized en-
terprises.41 The cyber insurance market develops slowly.42
D. Individual Risk Management
The alternative of individual risk management means that
the individual firm will deal with the cyber security risk itself
(for example, through security by design and ex post risk miti-
gation), rather than seeking to shift the risk through the
purchase of cyber insurance. Individual risk management is
therefore not a tool of risk shifting, but rather, as it is some-
times incorrectly termed, a form of “self-insurance.”43 Based
on the simple economic logic we just presented, it may be
clear that individual risk management will be attractive for
dealing with relatively small cyber risks (i.e., only minimal
damage will ensue if the risk materializes) or for wealthy firms.
To take an example unrelated to cyber security: most large oil
and gas producers (often referred to as “the majors”) have no
demand for insurance to cover risks related to the damage
caused by offshore facilities for the reason that they can cover
Contracts: A Case Study (LDE Centre for Safety and Security Working Paper);
EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, INCENTIVES AND BARRIERS OF THE CYBER
INSURANCE MARKET IN EUROPE (2012).
40. Perry Luzwick, If Most of Your Revenue is from E-Commerce, then Cyber-
Insurance Makes Sense, 3 COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY 16, 16–17 (2001); Jay
Kesan, Rupterto Majuca & William Yurcik, The Economic Case for Cyberin-
surance, (Univ. of Ill. L. & Econ. Working Papers Series, Paper No. LE04-004,
2004).
41. 2013 Cyber Risk Survey, MARSH (June 2013), https://www.marsh.com/
content/dam/marsh/Documents/PDF/UK-en/Cyber%20Risk%20Survey
%2006-2013.pdf. Willis estimates that 6% of the US firms purchased cyber
insurance, whereas the Harvard Business Review reports that 19% have done
so. WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, WILLIS FORTUNE 1000 CYBER REPORT 4 (2013);
Meeting the Cyber Risk Challenge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 12, 2012), https://
hbr.org/2012/12/meeting-the-cyber-risk-challen.html.
42. See, e.g., Scott Shackelford, Should Your Firm Invest in Cyber Risk Insur-
ance?, 55 BUS. HORIZONS 349, 353–55 (2012); Biener, Eling & Wirfs, supra
note 6.
43. Self-insurance is not insurance as there is no risk spreading, but usu-
ally it just concerns a reservation for future losses. See Michael Faure, Alterna-
tive Compensation Mechanisms as Remedy for Uninsurability of Liability, 29 GE-
NEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 455, 457–58 (2004).
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the risk themselves.44 As a result, British Petroleum (BP) did
not have sufficient insurance coverage when the mobile off-
shore oil rig Deepwater Horizon exploded on April 20, 2010,
causing massive damage.45 Target Corp., which experienced a
major data breach in 2013, only had cyber insurance coverage
for 36% of the damage.46 For smaller firms, the potential im-
pact and liability of cyber risks could go well beyond their own
solvency.47
However, individual risk management also has its limits.
In the case of individual risk management, the disutility
caused by risk aversion is not remedied. Moreover, the private
party has no incentives for the sharing of knowledge among
organizations. In the case of individual investment in preven-
tion, the externality problem persists in the sense that there
may be underinvestment or overinvestment on the part of the
private party relative to the social optimum. In a situation with
correlated risks, the firms’ security depends on the behavior of
others and vice versa. Hence, the incentives for security invest-
ments may even be perverse, as third-party behavior possibly
negates or increases the payoffs the firm receives from its own
investment in protective measures.48
E. A Third Way?
Neither individual risk management nor cyber insurance
offer perfect incentives for managing the capricious nature of
cyber risks. A third possible risk allocation structure is cyber
risk pooling. Cyber risk pooling is in essence risk sharing be-
tween operators without the interference of a third party such
44. Michael Faure, Liu Jing & Wang Hui, A Multilayered Approach to Cover
Damage Caused by Offshore Facilities, 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 356, 385 (2015).
45. Michael Cessna, Insurance Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster,
INS. L. BLOG (May 17, 2010), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/
insurance/b/insurance-law-blog/archive/2010/05/17/insurance-implica
tions-of-the-deepwater-horizon-disaster-by-michael-cessna-of-counsel-lathrop-
amp-gage-llp.aspx.
46. See Target’s Cyber Liability Insurance Covered 36% of Its Data Breach Costs.
How Much Does Yours Cover?, INSUREON BLOG (Mar. 24, 2015, 8:25 AM),
http://www.insureon.com/blog/post/2015/03/24/how-much-does-your-
cyber-liability-insurance-cover.aspx.
47. MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYS-
TEMIC RISKS (2003).
48. See Howard Kunreuther & Geoffrey Heal, Interdependent Security, 26 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 231 (2003).
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as an insurer.49 Hans Buhlmann defines risk pooling as fol-
lows:
[A]ny formal mutual agreement among the n compa-
nies that, operating as an entity, (1) accepts the re-
sponsibility for paying for an input . . . (2) charges
[companies] an output . . . for accepting the input,
according to the agreed-upon rule for sharing risks;
(3) operates on a zero-balance conservation princi-
ple . . . .”50
Provided that certain conditions are met, we argue that
cyber risk pooling can potentially move organizations to desir-
able (hybrid) forms of risk allocation. Cyber risk pooling, as
we will argue, can potentially provide ex post compensation to
risk averse operators to cover damage caused by cyber risks,
and at the same time, can contribute to the ex ante prevention
of cyber risks, thus increasing cyber security within society. In
this sense, cyber risk pooling can generate positive externali-
ties for society at large.
II.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CYBER RISK POOLING
In this part, we will discuss pooling relative to individual
risk management and cyber insurance. Theoretical studies
mention various circumstances in which (cyber) risk pooling
might be beneficial for participants and for society relative to
individual investment decisions regarding the management of
(cyber) security risk.51 Karl Borch was the first to analyze opti-
mal risk sharing between two parties.52 Kenneth Arrow dis-
cussed various problems related to insurance, such as the in-
herent problem of moral hazard.53 Yet it was the Swedish
economist Göran Skogh who demonstrated in a seminal 1999
article in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
49. Cyber risk pooling is also called a form of mutual insurance, or risk
sharing, or the formation of risk clubs.
50. Hans Buhlmann & William Jewell, Optimal Risk Exchanges, 10 ASTIN
BULL. 243, 245 (1979).
51. Id. Buhlmann and Jewell explore general forms of exchange that re-
sult in simultaneous improvement of risk for all parties. Id.
52. Karl Borch, Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market, 30 ECONOMETRICA 424
(1962).
53. Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
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that mutual and collective risk sharing between different
agents can be beneficial when the probability distribution of
losses is uncertain or impossible to estimate.54 Skogh showed
that, as opposed to insurance, mutually beneficial risk sharing
is also possible without assignment of probabilities.55 This is so
because in the insurance context, assignment of probabilities
is always necessary in order to calculate a premium.56 In a risk
sharing agreement, partners can also share losses ex post, as
risk sharing is possible so long as the partners in the pool are
faced with the same risk.57 This explains why an insurance
market can only reach maturity once considerable actuarial in-
formation is available.58 Thus the concept of risk pooling is
not new, but to the authors’ knowledge, no practical applica-
tion of risk sharing in cyber pooling has yet been applied.
A. Pooling Relative to Insurance
In this section, we describe the advantages of pooling rela-
tive to insurance. In the next section, we compare pooling
with individual risk management. The main difference be-
tween insurance and risk sharing via pooling is that insurance
always requires an assignment of probabilities in order to cal-
culate a premium.59 Pooling, on the contrary, is more flexible
in that it permits even an unpredictable distribution of risks.60
Operators exposed to a similar risk can share that risk even
when the specific probabilities are unknown, while in the in-
surance context, an unknown distribution of risks prevents in-
54. See Göran Skogh, Risk-sharing Institutions for Unpredictable losses, 155 J.
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 505 (1999).
55. Id. at 509–10.
56. Id. at 506–09.
57. Id. at 510.
58. Skogh & Wu, supra note 38, at 35.
59. Skogh, supra note 54, at 505.
60. John Marshall, Insurance Theory: Reserves versus Mutuality, 12 ECON.
INQ. 476 (1974). Marshall identified two principles under which insurance
might function: the reserve, or transfer, principle and the mutualization
principle. Under the reserve principle, risk is transferred to external risk
bearers to hold in a reserve from which to discharge claims. With mutualiza-
tion, policyholders jointly hold the residual claims on the pool. Total losses
are shared among policyholders by some combination of prepaid premium
and retroactive dividend. The reserve principle is efficient when, by the law
of large numbers, the average loss is predictable with virtual certainty while
the mutualization principle can be used in more general circumstances. Id.
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dependent insurers from using the law of large numbers,
which assumes that the actual payout on claims will ultimately
converge with the average, or expected, payout.61 Skogh and
Hong Wu use the example of ship owners sharing losses to
illustrate how risk sharing materializes.62 Their example in-
volves the sharing of a potential loss of ships and their respec-
tive cargo in a situation where no insurance is available. The
two ship-owners have a similar ship, cargo, crew and route, and
thus the same (unknown) probability of a loss. They would ex-
pect to benefit by sharing the loss of a ship. The two ship-own-
ers also realize that the pooling would be more efficient if they
could increase the number of partners in the risk sharing
group. But the offer to join the pool must be restricted to ship-
owners with the same cargo and destination, which could fur-
ther prove a ship and crew of comparable quality. Limitations
on the pooling arrangement exist in the varying value of ship
and cargo, as well as varying destinations. But these shortcom-
ings can be solved using a unit of measure called a “share,”
which permits partners to join the pool with different shares.
In this way, the risks at sea can be diversified. Since the pool
members have a common interest in the prevention of acci-
dents, they are incentivized to introduce safety regulations ac-
cording to the information available. As time goes by, they also
obtain further information on “high” and “low” risks. The ten-
dency of low risks to leave the pool is mitigated by adjustments
in the partners’ respective shares, and the benefit of a large
pool is thereby maintained.
For Skogh and Wu, the tale paints a plausible picture of
the development of pooling and the evolution of insurance,
even if experience and historical information may further sim-
plify pricing and thus simplify the trade of risks in the market.
Several additional points can be made about risk pooling ar-
rangements. The first is that all participants may beneficially
share hazards that are unpredictable or unforeseeable, as long
as the presumption of equality is mutually accepted. The ques-
tion remains whether such a presumption of equality can be
established in the case of cyber security risks.
61. Neil Doherty & Georges Dionne, Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk:
Contract Structure and Organizational Form of Insurance Firms, 6 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 187, 188 (1993).
62. Skogh & Wu, supra note 38.
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Second, the pool has the flexibility to develop and issue
specialized policies to its members. Risk pools have the flexibil-
ity to provide specific coverage or additional coverage beyond
the scope of insurance companies.63 Since risk pool partici-
pants are the owners of a risk pool, the usual conflict of inter-
est between insurers and policyholders does not play a role in
risk pooling agreements.
Third, total costs can be lower in the case of risk pools.
Under an insurance policy, the risk is shifted to the insurer at
the price of a premium. The premium is not recoverable by
the insured regardless of whether the insured risk materializes
or not. Under a risk sharing agreement, a member only con-
tributes if an accident happens; the duty to contribute can ei-
ther be postponed or the contribution can be carried over to
the following year if no accident occurs. A member can also
recover his contribution by refraining from creating the risk
and leaving the pool. Another cost saving property of risk
pooling is that expensive overhead and so called “insurer am-
biguity” costs are avoided.64 The costs of ambiguity can be
lower in a risk pooling arrangement since operators exposed
to the same risk can be assumed to have better information
about the risk than insurers would.65 In cyber security, this is
especially the case when information is shared.66 Connected to
the cost saving argument, a cyber pool might also be beneficial
from a liquidity point of view, since money does not “disap-
pear”: if nothing happens, it stays in the pockets of the pool’s
participants.67
Fourth, pooling can address the conflicts of interest that
arise between the insurer and insured. One of the most promi-
nent conflicts of interest is moral hazard occurring after the
insurance contract is closed.68 For example, the insured might
63. Zhao, Xue & Whinston, supra note 3.
64. Id.
65. Kunreuther, Hogarth & Meszaros, supra note 36, at 72.
66. Florian Skopik, Giuseppe Settanni & Roman Fiedler, A Problem Shared
is a Problem Halved: A Survey on the Dimensions of Collective Cyber Defense Through
Security Information Sharing, 60 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 154 (2016).
67. This depends on the funding structure of the pool. See infra Section
III.C.
68. Moral hazard is closely linked to adverse selection, which occurs ex
ante, before signing the contract in situation where complete information is
absent. Moreover, it is often hard to distinguish moral hazard from adverse
selection in empirical research.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372960 
2018] LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBER RISK POOLING 939
start behaving differently (e.g., take less care) because he him-
self no longer bears the losses of a damaging event.69 It is too
costly for the insurer to perfectly monitor the behavior of the
insured, which can therefore exhibit these undetected ac-
tions.70 In a risk sharing agreement, mutuality is created,
whereby the contribution paid by one member depends on
the claims made by all other members.71 It is in the interests of
all members’ claims to be as low as possible and thus a mutual
interest in risk minimization is created.72 To reduce risks, the
members of such a group has incentives both to differentiate
risks to align each member’s contribution to the risk they
pose, and to monitor each other. Mutuality is established when
the members are subject to similar safety rules. The members
are faced with the same type of risk and often have more ex-
pertise and more precise knowledge than a third-party insurer
would.73 This may also be the case in relation to cyber risks,
since the participants would have identical IT processes, which
would enable them to evaluate the risk each member creates
ex ante, and in so doing they can better monitor each other’s
behavior.
Because the likelihood that the members of the pool will
have to pay depends on the performance of all members,
there will be strong incentives for mutual monitoring. In the
event one member attempts to “free-ride” and not take safety
efforts seriously this, would create the same moral hazard
problem which arises under insurance contracts.74 Just as
monitoring by the insurer is required to cure the moral hazard
69. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541
(1979).
70. Information asymmetry, such as between the insurer and insured, is
an important property of cyber security risks. See Biener, Eling & Wirfs, supra
note 6, at 143–44.
71. Paul Bennett, Mutual Risk: P&I Insurance Clubs and Maritime Safety and
Environmental Performance, 25 MARINE POL’Y 13, 15 (2001). Policyholders are
themselves the owners of an insurance pool. See Zhao, Xue & Whinston,
supra note 3, at 126.
72. Bennett, supra note 71.
73. Michael Faure & Karine Fiore, The Coverage of the Nuclear Risk in Eu-
rope: Which Alternative?, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 288, 302 (2008).
74. Wondon Lee & James Ligon, Moral Hazard in Risk Pooling Arrange-
ments, 68 J. RISK & INS. 175 (2001) (discussing pool size in relation to moral
hazard and insurance).
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risk in insurance contracts,75 in this case the pool members
will have strong incentives for mutual monitoring in order to
ensure that one risky member does not increase the collective
risk.
B. Pooling Relative to Individual Risk Management
In the case of individual risk management, there is no risk
shifting nor risk sharing whatsoever. In other words, individual
risk management does not solve any collective risk aversion
since it is only the operator who remains exposed to the risk.
To the extent that there is risk aversion as discussed in Section
I.A, risk sharing via a pool naturally has advantages. Compared
to individual management, risks are naturally better distrib-
uted in a risk pool, because they are shared. The actual dam-
age for each policyholder will converge with the average dam-
age based on the law of large numbers.76 A problem with cyber
security risks is the fact that they can correlate, especially when
organizations in a pool use similar IT systems vulnerable to
similar cyber threats.77 Unfortunately, this is quite often the
case, since IT product vendors are usually large players due to
the economics of scale and lock-in effects inherent in the pre-
sent IT market.78 Nevertheless, some cyber risks are less likely
to correlate, as we shall discuss in Section V.A.
Because the participants in a pool have an equity stake in
each other’s risk, the positive and negative externalities arising
from information security investments can be partially inter-
nalized. Insofar as those externalities do not extend beyond
the pool members, they will be fully internalized.79
75. Shavell, supra note 69, at 541.
76. See Lee & Ligon, supra note 74, at 176.
77. For discussion of the trade-off between risk spreading and mutual
monitoring, see infra Section V.B.
78. See, e.g., HAL VARIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 2004).
79. Lawrence A. Gordon, Martin P. Loeb & William Lucyshyn, Sharing
Information on Computer Systems Security: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. ACCT. &
PUB. POL’Y 461, 469–70 (2003). This is also the case in insurance, provided
that insurers can distinguish these externalities.
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C. Benefits of Pooling Compared to Individual Allocation and
Insurance
In a cyber risk pool, the risk is being shared with other
participants, but an operator also takes a part of the risk of
other participants in the pool. This creates incentives to coop-
erate and share knowledge. Based on the literature, we there-
fore expect that in a cyber risk pool there are strong incentives
to share current knowledge and best practices, especially when
similar organizations are connected in a risk pool. Some orga-
nizations may have more information about efficient risk re-
duction. A risk pool brings them together, or otherwise brings
in an expert to help them (referred to as a managed security
service, or “MSS”80). In other words, existing knowledge dif-
fuses better amongst the pool.81 Observe that the first trade-off
in risk pooling design emerges here. A homogeneous pool is
good for knowledge diffusion and mutual monitoring, while a
heterogeneous pool is better from a risk spreading perspec-
tive. We will further discuss this trade-off in Section V.B.
Cooperation and knowledge-sharing may eventually even
result in more joint (as well as more cost efficient) investment
in (external) risk reduction. Joint investments may ultimately
produce a set of standards which would make basic cyber se-
curity more standardized.
D. Drawbacks of Pooling
There are several important drawbacks to the pooling
structure. First, an important precondition for mutual risk
sharing to work in its most simple form is that the parties in
the pool must accept and trust that they all statistically face a
similar risk.82 Parties need to have a similar or at least compa-
rable cyber security risk ex ante and need to carry out similar
security efforts ex post. When this is not the case, the organiza-
tions that invest more will eventually drop out of the pool be-
cause for them the costs will exceed the benefits. In that sense,
there is a danger that a risk pool may be unstable, because
there will always be participants in a risk pool with a (slightly)
80. Zhao, Xue & Whinston, supra note 3, at 126.
81. Gordon, Loeb & Lucyshyn, supra note 79; Anderson & Moore, supra
note 2.
82. Göran Skogh, Development Risks, Strict Liability, and the Insurability of
Industrial Hazards, 23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 247, 254 (1998).
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better security position (ex ante or ex post) who will drop out,
which may in turn weaken the pool. There is always the prob-
lem that pooling may be more attractive for participants that
carry high risks. If these risks cannot be adequately identified,
adverse selection will prevent pooling from emerging.83 How-
ever, even if risks are not homogeneous, this is not necessarily a
problem as long as it is possible to differentiate and compart-
mentalize the risk (for example, by requiring the participant
who constitutes a larger risk to pay a larger contribution to the
pool).84
Second, this danger of free-riding will be worsened when
mutual monitoring is impractical or impossible, in which case
moral hazard may endanger the pool. As Steven Shavell
pointed out: “[w]hen monitoring is impractical, the optimal
market response to moral hazard is generally partial insurance
coverage.”85 In cyber security, mutual monitoring can indeed
be difficult from a knowledge point of view, but those who pos-
sess the requisite knowledge are fairly equipped to monitor
participants in a pool.86 This incentive for mutual monitoring
will in principle be strong, since the pool has the incentive to
control all of its members given that the collective risk will in-
crease if one of its members seeks to free-ride. For technical
and highly complicated (new) risks, operators may in some
cases have better information (compared to insurers) on opti-
mal preventive technologies, which might include differentia-
tion of the contribution to the pool or exclusion of bad risks
from the pool’s membership. A question will of course arise: to
what extent is the pool able to execute an effective mutual
monitoring and thus to control moral hazard and adverse se-
lection? If differentiation between different types of risk would
not be sufficiently possible, moral hazard cannot adequately
be controlled and there is a likelihood that the pool will not
83. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insur-
ance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON.
629, 634–37 (1976).
84. Id.
85. Lee & Ligon, supra note 74, at 176.
86. Interview with Rick Hofstede, Cyber Security Analyst, Redsocks (Oct.
21, 2016).
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emerge or that firms reduce their own investment and free-
ride on others.87
Third, the setup of a pool requires an extraordinary effort
and has large positive externalities, which are possibly too
large for one party to bear. Since it may be difficult for the
participant that sets up the pool to recover the costs it incurs
in doing so, he must either do it for altruistic reasons or else
stand to receive a very large private benefit from the pool’s
creation.88 To overcome this problem with setting up pooling
arrangements, a broker might be necessary to set up the pool
and “guard” the rules of the game. It that sense, the managed
security service proposed by Xue Zhao can also be beneficial,
because the private security party spreads knowledge and in-
ternalizes externalities.89
Another limitation of pooling is the fact that the capacity
of the pool may be limited, which would entail that the pool-
ing cannot completely eliminate risk. Additional insurance be-
yond the cap that is set by the pool might therefore be neces-
sary.
In summation, there are three potential drawbacks of
pooling: the pool needs to be able to control the problems of
1) adverse selection, and 2) moral hazard, and 3) there need
to be sufficient incentives for the originator to create the pool.
Those drawbacks are at the same time also conditions for ef-
fective risk sharing. If these drawbacks can be properly ad-
dressed, cyber risk pooling may become possible.
III.
EXPERIENCES IN OTHER SECTORS
Pooling certainly has potential drawbacks, or, formulated
differently, there are specific preconditions that must be met
in order for pooling to work. Nevertheless, experiences in
other sectors show that risk pooling can generate the benefits
87. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324
(1982).
88. Of course, one of the participants could also initiate the pool and let
other participants pay for the pool. However, setting up cyber risk pools is
probably not the business of such a private initiator, which makes it extra
costly (because there is no experience) to start such a business. Precisely for
that reason it is often large brokers that take the initiative to organize a risk
sharing agreement.
89. Zhao, Xue & Whinston, supra note 3.
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described in the literature. In addition to briefly describing
the functioning of two existing pools (more particularly the
functioning of the so-called “Broodfonds” in the Netherlands
and the “P&I Clubs” that cover maritime risks), we will also
discuss two other initiatives where the creation of a risk shar-
ing agreement proved more problematic. Examining the rea-
sons why there were difficulties in the creation of the second
set of pools contributes to an empirical perspective on the for-
mulation of preconditions for successful cyber pooling.
A. Broodfondsen
A Broodfonds (literally, “bread-fund”) is a risk pool in
which self-employed people share their risks of becoming inca-
pacitated and prevented from working.90 The main reason
why the Broodfondsen emerged in 2006 was because disability
insurance for self-employed individuals was expensive. In early
2016, there were 182 Broodfondsen, which even backed each
other financially, in a form of re-insurance.91 In an interview
with the founder of the Broodfonds, it turned out that mutual
monitoring works well, as the self-employed “regularly meet
and check upon each other.”92 The checkups also have a social
function, since participants also mutually share knowledge and
90. See, e.g., Ties Wiezel, Ziek en Zelfstandig? Dan is een broodfonds misschien
iets voor jou, NRC (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/03/22/
nrc-q-ziek-en-zelfstandig-dan-is-een-broodfonds-misschien-iets-voor-jou-a1493
495; ZZP Broodfonds: sterk sociaal idee, STICHTING ZZP NEDERLAND (Nov. 30,
2016), https://www.zzp-nederland.nl/actueel/nieuws/zzp-broodfonds-sterk-
sociaal-idee.
91. On Broodfonds’ website, the Broodfonds system is described in more
detail. “Members of a bread fund group who fall sick receive donations from
the other members in their group, the total amounting to a net monthly
income. The participants open individual bank accounts dedicated to their
‘bread fund’. On these accounts the people who join a broodfonds save a fixed
amount per month: between C= 33.75 and C= 112.50. They also pay a one-time
service fee of C= 250 and a monthly contribution of C= 10. If members fall sick,
they receive net donations depending on their own monthly contribution:
between C= 750 and C= 2500. Personal donations can be tax-free under Dutch
tax law. The monthly savings that accumulate on the bank account of each
member are considered as personal savings and when people cancel their
participation they collect this sum.” BROODFONDS, https://www.broodfonds
.nl/hoe_het_werkt (last visited Aug. 5, 2018).
92. Interview with Biba Schoenmaker, founder of Broodfonds (Nov.
2016); see also Hoe het werkt, BROODFONDS, http://www.broodfonds.nl/
hoe_het_werkt (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
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ideas. All in all, the loss ratios and costs are much lower com-
pared to forms of social insurance for unemployment. It is un-
clear whether this is created by self-selection or through better
monitoring and early checkups.
B. P&I Clubs
Another example of mutual risk sharing comes from the
maritime context and is provided by the so-called protection
and indemnity clubs, or “P&I clubs.” A P&I club is a non-profit
making mutual insurance association which is established by
ship owners and charterers to cover their third-party liabilities
related to the use and operation of ships. Today, there are
thirteen independent P&I clubs internationally, which collec-
tively account for approximately 90% of the world’s oceango-
ing tonnage.93
In the maritime transportation arena, the technical uncer-
tainties regarding the occurrence of oil spills, combined with
the legal uncertainties with respect to establishing liability,
make it difficult to cover the risk of marine oil pollution using
a traditional insurance policy. The P&I clubs appeared as a
response to commercial insurers’ reluctance to underwrite cer-
tain maritime risks.94 P&I policies cover the liabilities specifi-
cally enumerated in the agreement: the club’s “rulebook.” P&I
coverage usually includes unlimited reimbursement for claims
arising from: liabilities in respect of persons; liability in respect
of cargo, collision with ships, or with fixed and floating ob-
jects; salvage; compulsory wreck removal; fines imposed by
government agencies; quarantine expenses; towage liabilities;
“sue and labor” and legal costs; any other liabilities which the
club’s directors deem proper to cover; as well as limited reim-
bursement for oil pollution claims which arise from the mem-
bers’ vessels.95 The coverage of a P&I policy can be rather
93. See IGP&I (Feb. 24, 2018, 6:01 PM), http://www.igpandi.org/about.
94. Norman Ronneberg, An Introduction to the Protection & Indemnity Clubs
and the Marine Insurance They Provide, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 25–29 (1990).
95. Id. at 7–9. Ronneberg’s analysis was based on the Swedish Club’s
1990 rulebook. A similar coverage can also be found in the 2010 rulebook of
the United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association (Bermuda)
Limited [hereinafter BERMUDA RULEBOOK]. In the rulebooks, the “unlim-
ited” reimbursement does not mean that the Club should pay the full costs
which fall into the categories. Instead, the reimbursement is subject to the
limitation of liability set by law. While for oil pollution claims, the compensa-
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broad: not only does it provide coverage of liability for ecologi-
cal damage, but the relevant personal injury and property
damage as well as other non-environmental losses are also cov-
ered. A P&I club provides services beyond those of the typical
insurer, operating as an insurance company, law firm and loss
adjuster all in one. Besides offering insurance coverage, a P&I
club can also provide a worldwide network of correspondents
and representatives which can 1) give on-the-spot assistance to
the ship owner when required, 2) offer Letters of Undertaking
as security when members’ vessels are arrested, and 3) assist in
claims handling and settlement.96
Under the P&I policies, the insured must have suffered
actual monetary losses before they can seek reimbursement
from the other members. That means a member is only enti-
tled to seek compensation for the amount he has in fact lost
due to the occurrence of a covered incident. This is called the
“pay to be paid” rule, which is usually incorporated in the
club’s rulebook. Under a P&I policy, the club is only obligated
to assist its contractual counterparts (the club’s members) in
case of losses. Thus the injured usually cannot bring a direct
action against a P&I club and can only obtain the compensa-
tion through a claim or litigation against, or settlement with,
the injurer.
The P&I Group arranges reinsurance for all the clubs.
Presently, under the ship owners’ policies, each club retains
the first $8 million as their retentions. The amount between $8
million and $60 million is divided among all the clubs. Hydra
Insurance Company (the designated insurer of the Group)
and the international insurance market also play an important
role in providing reinsurance for the upper levels. This brings
the upper limit of its reinsurance program to $3.06 billion. Of
this amount, the limit for compensation for oil pollution is
$1.06 billion.97
ble sums are determined by Directors of the Club. See Rule 5B, BERMUDA
RULEBOOK.
96. Ronneberg, supra note 94, at 25–29.
97. See INT’L GROUP OF P&I ASS’N, 2018 REINSURANCE DIAGRAM, AM. CLUB
(Feb. 20, 2018), http://www.american-club.com/files/files/2018_Reinsur
ance.pdf.
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C. Pooling Offshore Oil Drilling Risks
There are, however, two examples which show that risk
sharing can in some cases be problematic. One is risk sharing
in the area of offshore drilling risks. Two risk sharing agree-
ments exist for offshore oil risks: OIL Insurance Ltd. (OIL)
and OIL Casualty Insurance Ltd. (OCIL).98 OIL and OCIL are
essentially risk sharing agreements among operators. They
provide a maximum coverage of $300 million, but have a high
deductible of “not less than $10 million.”99 Notwithstanding
the potential advantages of risk pooling arrangements, this
type of risk pooling scheme is not very popular in practice.
Major operators like BP are relatively critical of these schemes,
arguing that they do not sufficiently differentiate the risks in-
volved.100
Moreover, detractors argue that the risk pools do not pro-
vide full support since, depending upon the contractual ar-
rangements, in some cases the liable operator will be compen-
sated (either by OIL or OCIL) but will have to repay (a part
of) the damage over a defined (usually five-year) period.101
Further, the mutualization between OIL and OCIL make them
unattractive to large operators due to the danger of smaller
operators free-riding, in which case the majors would become
the de facto guarantors of the smaller operators.102
In this case, the problem is that the damage can poten-
tially be very high, but the probability is very low. Given the
relatively low probability of an accident occurring, the differ-
ence between an ideal risk and a large risk may be that the
ideal risks contribute $30 thousand dollars each and the large
risks $60 thousand. That difference is simply too small: the
large risk could simply pay a contribution and then free-ride
on the ideal risks which have to contribute following an acci-
dent. Pools thus provide a safety net of sorts for smaller players
with limited balance sheets, and the risk differentiation in-
98. Regis Coccia, Munich Re Outlines Liability Coverage Innovation for Off-
shore Oil Risks, BUS. INS. (Dec. 9, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessin
surance.com/article/20100912/NEWS/100919977.
99. Faure, Liu & Wang, supra note 44, at 389–90.
100. Interview with representatives of BP (Mar. 26, 2013).
101. Interview with representatives of OGP (Feb. 25, 2013).
102. Interview with representatives of Shell International BV, in Rotter-
dam, Neth. (Mar. 14, 2013).
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volved is simply insufficient.103 In essence, the problem of ad-
verse selection cannot be cured, as major players fear that they
are being asked to back up smaller players without sufficient
risk differentiation.
D. Ria de Vigo
Another failed risk sharing agreement (on a much
smaller scale) was attempted on the Ria de Vigo in Northwest
Spain.104 In this risk sharing agreement, several fisheries
would share risks for marine pollution, such as oil spills. A
study showed that although a risk sharing agreement could be
very beneficial for operators in the particular region, many
misperceptions and objections inhibited the creation of a risk
sharing agreement. Some operators confused risk sharing with
commercial, for-profit insurance; others did not understand
that a risk sharing agreement would allow the transfer of risk
and conceived of it as a clearing house of sorts to transfer
money. In the particular case of the Ria de Vigo, the creation
of a risk sharing agreement failed largely as a result of insuffi-
cient understanding of the benefits and operation of the pro-
posed scheme and apprehensions about free-riders abusing
the arrangement.105 This example clearly shows the impor-
tance of good communication about the potential benefits of a
risk sharing agreement among the operators to be exposed to
the risk in question.
IV.
CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE CYBER RISK SHARING
In Part III, we discussed the benefits and drawbacks of
pooling in comparison with individual management and cyber
insurance. The examples show that risk sharing can be an at-
tractive tool to protect risk-averse actors by generating large
amounts of compensation and providing better risk preven-
tion through mutual monitoring. The same benefits can theo-
retically be obtained in the cyber security market as well. How-
ever, both theory and practice show that risk sharing may not
103. Id.
104. Schimon Grossmann & Michael Faure, Conditions for Effective Risk
Sharing Against Marine Pollution: The Case of the Ria de Vigo, NW Spain, 2
ENVTL. LIABILITY. 59 (2016).
105. Id. at 68.
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be able to generate those benefits under all circumstances.
Based on both the literature and examples from other sectors,
we can distinguish three main preconditions for effective risk
sharing, which we will analyze.106
A. Sufficiently Unattractive Alternatives
The first condition is that the alternatives to pooling,
namely individual management or cyber insurance, must be
sufficiently unattractive. In the case of P&I clubs we observed
pooling in situations where insurers did not want to enter the
market while at the same time the harm of an individual inci-
dent exceeded the solvency of any individual organization. In
the case of the Broodfonds we observed that the insurance al-
ternative was priced insufficiently competitively due to, high
information costs (among other things), while simultaneously
the risk of incapacitation was too large for any one individual
to bear.107 The fact that the alternatives were sufficiently unat-
tractive is of course related to the theoretical advantages of
risk shifting via pooling which we have sketched above in Sec-
tion II.C. Especially for new risks like in the cyber security con-
text, insurance may suffer from high insurer ambiguity (with
resulting risk premiums that are relatively high) and from the
impossibility of calculating actuarially fair premiums.108 Indi-
vidual risk management may be relatively unattractive as it
does not involve risk shifting and therefore neither provides ex
post compensation, nor diffusion of information that could
contribute to ex ante prevention. Cyber risk pooling can be rel-
atively attractive compared to those alternatives as it allows
pooling even when the statistical probabilities of incidents oc-
curring are unknown (which insurance does not allow for)
and since it can provide 1) ex post compensation for damage,
2) lower transaction costs, and 3) the sharing of information
which could enhance ex ante prevention (which individual risk
management does not provide).
106. Not surprisingly the conditions for an effective risk-sharing also re-
late, as we will show, to the conditions for the insurability of particular risks.
See, e.g., BARUCH BERLINER, LIMITS OF INSURABILITY OF RISKS (1st ed. 1982).
107. Interview with Biba Schoenmaker, Founder, Broodfonds (Feb. 11,
2016).
108. Biener, Eling & Wirfs, supra note 6.
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B. Effective Mutual Monitoring
As was made clear above in Section II.D, a second condi-
tion is that the problems of adverse selection and moral haz-
ard must be controlled.
Cyber risk pooling is obviously easiest if all participants in
the pool would statistically be facing a similar risk.109 In that
case, problems of adverse selection would not arise. However,
risk sharing of course need not require pure homogeneity. If,
for example, two farmers would conclude a risk sharing agree-
ment for the risk of their farmhouses being destroyed, risk
sharing is still possible even if one farm is double the value of
the other, which might simply entail that the farmer with the
more expensive house has a larger share in the pool.110 So too
in the case of cyber risks, the participants in the pool may not
all constitute homogeneous risks. Pooling is still possible as
long as the relative contribution of each participant in the
pool can be appropriately distinguished and be related to his
contribution. Also during the duration of the pool’s opera-
tion, mutual monitoring is necessary to cure the problem of
moral hazard.111 In cyber risk pools, this can be done through
the use of network monitoring, where either the participants
of a pool or a third party continuously scan the network traffic
of each participant. Network monitoring can be comple-
mented by mutual audits at regular intervals of the structure of
the IT architecture and the up-to-datedness of software. The
incentive for mutual monitoring will in principle be strong,
because the pool has the incentive to control all of its mem-
bers since the collective risk would increase if one of the mem-
bers attempts to free-ride. The different risks brought into the
pool by various participants can be reflected in a differentia-
tion of the contribution to the pool or in an exclusion of bad
risks from the pool’s membership. A question will of course
arise to what extent the pool is indeed able to execute an ef-
fective mutual monitoring and thus to control moral hazard
and adverse selection. If a differentiation between different
types of risk would not be sufficiently possible, moral hazard
cannot be adequately controlled and there is a likelihood that
the pool will not emerge.
109. See Skogh, supra note 82. See also Section V.B.
110. See Skogh, supra note 1, at 297–305.
111. Skogh, supra note 82.
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Mutual monitoring needs to take place with only limited
transaction costs. These transaction costs will be lower when
risks are similar or at least comparable. In principle, since sub-
jective probabilities do not need to be known ex ante,112 risk
sharing does not require past loss experience or statistical in-
formation (though again, these can lower costs). In a cyber
risk pool, a trade-off needs to be made as to the extent each
wants to monitor the other. With regard to network monitor-
ing, there are fixed costs and economies of scale in the techni-
cal set up of a monitoring system. These costs logically de-
crease when similar IT systems must be monitored. Moreover,
even when companies themselves have little experience and
knowledge in cyber security, they can hire IT consultants to
undertake the monitoring of the cyber security. Those consul-
tants often do have the required expertise to be able to ade-
quately monitor the level of cyber security of the partners in
the pool. However, the automatic detection of anomalies in a
monitoring system always leaves a residual which requires a
manual analysis at a relatively high variable cost.113 Lastly, mu-
tual trust can lower these costs because it reduces the need for
perfect mutual monitoring.
C. Practical Possibility of Setting Up a Pool
A practical condition for effective risk sharing is that there
must be a practical premise for creating the pool, which usu-
ally requires a party willing to take the initiative in setting up
the pool. This requires not only that the potential participants
are sufficiently aware of both the cyber security risks to which
they are exposed and the benefits of pooling, but even if those
conditions are met, there may arise the difficulty that it is sim-
ply costly and complicated to start a pool. Not only does it re-
quire a sufficient number of participants in order to have ade-
quate risk spreading, but someone needs to take the initiative.
This could lead to substantial start-up costs. Pooling therefore
either requires one participant with a potentially large interest
in starting a pool or a third party (in practice often a broker)
who is able to initiate the pool cost effectively. In both cases
the upfront costs for setting up the pool can of course be later
112. Skogh, supra note 1, at 297–305.
113. Interview with Steffen Morrees, Cyber Security Analyst at Fox IT (May
10, 2017).
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recovered from the participants. A degree of trust ex ante is
likely beneficial for the start-up process. For example, in an
environment of trust, participants are more likely to be toler-
ant regarding the possible existence of slight inequalities in
the size of each participant’s share in the pool.
V.
THE DESIGN OF A CYBER RISK POOL
Cyber pooling, as has been shown, has advantages com-
pared to individual cyber risk management and may be able to
provide coverage in cases where cyber insurance may not be
able to. But risk sharing also has particular drawbacks and
therefore conditions that must be met for pooling to emerge.
This part discusses the main design parameters for risk pool
contract design in cyber security.
A. The Covered Risks
A risk pool is an alternative form of risk management.
The first design parameter to discuss is thus, naturally, the
choice of risks to include in the pooling arrangement. We dis-
cuss four perspectives for determining suitable cyber risks for
coverage in pooling.
1. Impact
A first criterion is the impact of the risk. The impact of
the risk is of course directly related to the economic aspect of
risk aversion. As indicated above, a demand for risk shifting
will emerge principally in the case of relatively large risks, that
is, risks whose magnitude goes beyond the individual capacity
of operators. Risks that have a small potential impact are easily
manageable by individual organizations.114 A demand for risk
sharing via pooling will only emerge for risks that have a
higher magnitude. Personal data breaches can result in signifi-
cant costs, which may consist of, for instance, legal sanctions,
disclosure and mitigation costs and reputational damage.115
However, a problem may equally arise with so-called cata-
114. See Zhao, Xue & Whinston, supra note 3 (arguing that risk sharing, or
RPA, which stands for Risk Pooling Arrangement, is ineffective if the risks
are sufficiently small).
115. BERNOLD NIEUWESTEEG, THE LEGAL POSITION OF SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (TU Delft, 2014).
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strophic, or high impact, risks. High impact risks, especially
those on a level that is not bearable even once distributed
across the participants of the pool, are not suitable for pooling
either, because the damage of an individual incident exceeds
the solvency of the participants in the pool. The exact ex-
pected damage of cyber risks is often hard to determine.116
However, as discussed in Section II.A, pooling arrangements
are more flexible when it comes to unknown distributions of
risk. A widely-used approach to determining ex ante which risks
are included in a risk pooling arrangement is to set caps and
deductibles that basically set an impact interval within which
the pooling arrangement applies.117 With the right cap and
deductible, an ex ante determination of the potential impact of
risks is no longer necessary. Correlated risks, whereby multiple
or even all the participants in a pool experience high impact
at the same time, remain an issue. To mitigate the risk of cor-
related risks, the cap must be sufficiently low, or there must be
a form of reinsurance in the case of a strong correlation of
risks.
2. Hybrid Models
A pool that uses deductibles and caps is often part of a
hybrid model where all three risk allocation structures (indi-
vidual management, pooling, cyber insurance) are used. A
cyber risk pool is almost always a part of multilayered ap-
proach:
Below the deductible, the participant individually man-
ages its risk. This makes sense, because bearable risks should
not be shared or transferred.118 These are risks (e.g., minor
data loss or subsets of larger risks) that are too small to require
risk sharing.
Medium-sized risks are suitable for pooling. The question
is what exactly, in terms of damage, are medium-sized risks in
cyber security? An initial estimation could for example deter-
mine the interval of medium size risk to be between C= 500,000
116. For discussion of the nature of cyber risks, see supra Section I.B.
117. A cap is a maximum amount for the payout. A deductible is an
amount that must be paid by each participant in the pool before the com-
mon pool will pay.
118. For discussion of the theoretical foundations of risk shifting, see
supra Section I.A.
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and C= 5 million (roughly between $590,000 and $5.9 million).
Examples may include severe DDoS attacks or significant loss
of personal data. The maximum cap could be heightened
through reinsurance, possibly among several risk pools.119
For catastrophic cyber risks, risk sharing will not work, as
the pool may simply lack the capacity to deal with these losses.
Reinsurance can then capture the residual risk up to a certain
level. Thus, reinsurance is a possible solution, but in the cur-
rent cyber insurance environment, both deductibles and caps
appear to be relatively low.120 The insurance would then con-
sist of a so-called excess insurance where the coverage is only
taken for damage above a certain level. In the previous exam-
ple, it would consist of damage above C= 5 million up to the
limit of the insurable amount. Insurers use relatively low caps
and low deductibles, while this type of product would require
a high cap and (very) high deductibles.
3. Impact of Care Measures
It is important to study the effect of care measures on risk
reduction. It is desirable to pool risks that are relatively inde-
pendent from the care measures of the participants in the
pool. In such a situation, there will be less free-riding and
moral hazard because there is little or no relation between the
activity level of the participant and the size of the risk. Hence,
it is desirable when cyber risks occur exogenously, that is,
cyber-attacks that are relatively independent from the cyber in-
vestments of the participants in the pool. For instance, banking
Trojans seem to occur relatively randomly at US banks.121
4. Systemic Risks
Another important aspect is the correlation between inci-
dents of cyber risks. One major issue for both insurance and
pooling is that cyber risks tend to correlate because they have
a systemic character. Correlated risks, unfortunately present in
119. Brokers like Marsh and Willis provide these services, but only for very
large companies. The Broodfonds organizes reinsurance with other pools in
de Broodfonds.
120. Nieuwesteeg, Visscher & De Waard, supra note 39.
121. Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob et al., Why Them? Extracting Intelligence
about Target Selection from Zeus Financial Malware (unpublished working paper
presented at the thirteenth Annual Workshop on the Economics of Informa-
tion Security (WEIS)) (2014).
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cyber security at least on a theoretical level, hamper efficient
risk sharing. Correlation can be an important impediment to
an effective sharing of cyber risks.122 Correlation implies that
all companies in the pool are affected, and moreover, that the
losses in the pool are significant. Thus a trade-off is presented:
on the one hand, comparability of the risks would make mu-
tual monitoring and pooling easier; on the other hand, it
could increase the possibility of correlation and therefore the
risk exposure of the pool. One option to mitigate the risk of
correlation is to focus on those types of risks which have high
internal (but low cross-organizational) correlation, such as in-
sider attacks.123
B. Size and Type of Participants in the Pool
In this section, we show the main trade-offs when choos-
ing between smaller or larger groups (size of pool), when se-
lecting either homogeneous or heterogeneous groups (type of
participants), and when choosing the organizational size of
the participants.
1. Group Size
We assume that the degree of internalization of societal
risk increases if group size increases. Large groups are better
capable of internalizing externalities because they form a
larger part of society. Moreover, in order to create a sufficient
degree of risk spreading, there needs to be a reasonably large
group. The law of large numbers becomes more accurate as
the group size increases. Consequently, larger groups will tend
to approach socially optimal behavior better. An increased
group size therefore better enables risk sharing.124 However,
with larger groups, information costs also increase. This is
caused by the fact that there are higher transaction costs in-
volved in mutual monitoring. Consequently, ceteris paribus (all
else being equal), larger groups will experience a greater con-
cern of moral hazard and of adverse selection. The impact of
122. So also with respect to the insurability of cyber risks. See Biener, Eling
& Wirfs, supra note 6.
123. Rainer Bohme & Gaurav Kataria, Models and Measures for Correlation in
Cyber-Insurance (unpublished working paper presented at the fifth Annual
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS)) (2006).
124. Lee & Ligon, supra note 74.
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individual free-riding on the personal risk distribution is also
lower in larger groups, which decreases incentives to correct
other participants. Yet from a practical point of view, it is eas-
ier to set up a smaller pool than a larger one. Therefore, a
sufficient number of firms (but not too many) should be in-
cluded, all of which ideally face a similar risk, thereby making
possible an effective diversification of risk.125 In practice, we
have observed that effective risk pools have between 10 and 30
members.126
2. Type of Participants
The type of participants is defined as the degree of homo-
geneity among the participants, or in other words, the similar-
ity in the size of the organizations, IT processes, customers,
etc. Homogeneous organizations have fewer costs in monitor-
ing each other so as to avoid adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. For instance, if operators have the same software systems,
then mutual monitoring is straightforward, but also the risk of
correlation is higher and consequently risk spreading is lower.
Further, homogeneity is a catalyst for knowledge diffusion, es-
pecially in cyber security. Consider a Zero-Day hack of one of
the participants in the pool.127 A Zero-Day threat is an undiscov-
ered vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker. Once
the attack has been successfully executed, attackers will further
utilize the Zero-Day by executing attacks at similar organiza-
tions. Those vulnerable organizations are likely to include the
other participants in a homogeneous pool. After a while, ei-
ther a member of the pool or a third party such as the software
vendor will discover the Zero-Day. In such a situation effective
knowledge-sharing about the origins of the attack and solu-
tions to fix it can greatly reduce overall damage within the
pool. Note that here, the speed of the knowledge diffusion is
the main advantage. Moreover, setting up a risk pool is easier
when organizations do not vary widely in size and type, be-
cause a baseline defense effort can be established more easily.
125. Skogh, supra note 82, at 254.
126. We observed this amount of members, inter alia, at the Dutch Brood-
fonds. See supra Section III.A. Also P&I groups usually have a size of this
magnitude.
127. Interview with Steffen Morrees, Cyber Security Analyst at Fox IT (May
10, 2017).
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Recall the difficulties in setting up a risk sharing scheme in the
field of offshore oil pollution: since there are large differences
between the so-called major oil and gas producers on the one
hand, and smaller- and medium-sized enterprises on the
other, it is difficult to create a risk sharing agreement in which
those largely diverging risk types can jointly participate.128 As
was mentioned above, differences in risk profile between the
members of the pool are not necessarily a problem as long as
this can be recognized and compartmentalized by the pool
members. In such a case, principles of risk differentiation can
be applied (by requiring larger shares from the higher risk
members). A differentiation of the contribution in that sense
constitutes an adequate remedy for moral hazard and also pro-
vides incentives for prevention. On the negative side, there is
more correlation between cyber risks when there is more ho-
mogeneity amongst participants in the pool, as it is likely that
similar organizations use similar software systems and are vul-
nerable to similar kinds of attacks. Hence, there is a trade-off
between heterogeneity and homogeneity. Heterogeneity allows for
a better distribution of cyber risk, while homogeneity allows
for better mutual monitoring, lower costs and faster knowl-
edge diffusion.
3. Effects of Participant Size
As the example of risk sharing in the offshore oil pollu-
tion sector shows, the operators’ attitudes towards risk (which
is strongly related to their financial capacity) will strongly af-
fect the demand for risk shifting and hence the willingness to
participate in a pool. This same problem will be relevant in the
case of sharing cyber security risks. The demand for risk shift-
ing can be expected to be higher among relatively small and
medium-sized operators than among larger operators. Larger
operators may be able to cover most risks themselves and thus
have less demand for risk sharing. Moreover, larger operators
may even fear that small- and medium-sized operators would
free-ride given the mere size of the larger operators. This free-
riding problem was the reason it was so difficult to create a risk
sharing pool for oil pollution in the offshore sector and may to
some extent play a similar role in case of cyber security. One
way of potentially solving the problem is to create several risk
128. See supra Section III.C.
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pools with different types of players, each constituting rela-
tively homogeneous groups. The obvious solution would then
be to create one group for small- and medium-sized operators
and one for larger operators (to the extent that they have a
demand for risk shifting at all). Separating those risks into dif-
ferent risk pools may, moreover, improve risk differentiation
and thus better stimulate the preventive function of risk shar-
ing.129 A cyber risk pool that aims to deploy some kind of tech-
nical mutual monitoring solution arguably would need to con-
sist of at least medium-sized companies, because otherwise the
costs of such a monitoring solution would outweigh the bene-
fits.
C. Rules of Entry
One of the key determinants of a successful risk pool is its
ability to successfully monitor and select its participants ex ante
in order to reduce adverse selection. A degree of ex ante cyber
security is also important to disentangle the impact of the risk
from the care measures of the members of the pool, which, as
argued in Section V.A, is preferable in order to reduce free-
riding. If all members implement a level of security ex ante,
attacks that take place can be reasonably believed not to result
merely from careless behavior. Consider the example of ran-
somware discussed in Section I.B. Ransomware is widely used by
cybercriminals. However, an organization could greatly reduce
the risk from ransomware by implementing certain simple care
measures ex ante.130 In the case of a cyber risk pool, it can be
difficult or time-consuming to determine the level of cyber se-
curity ex ante. A third party, such as a security firm, can objec-
tively determine the level of security necessary to be imple-
mented ex ante by performing a network assessment and issu-
ing a certification. Often these certifications by private
certifiers will be used as proof of compliance with particular
security rules. Another option is to assume a given ex ante se-
curity level and to set this level as a precondition for payout ex
129. See George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987). Priest strongly stresses the importance of segregating
risks into relatively small risk pools with similar risks in order to prevent
adverse selection.
130. Interview with Steffen Morrees, Cyber Security Analyst at Fox IT (May
10, 2017).
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post. In a cyber risk pool, one could require extensive logging,
which would allow for tracing back the origins of the cyber
attack and determining the organization’s level of cyber secur-
ity at the moment of attack. Moreover, government or private
regulation can also assist in determining the required level of
cyber security. Further, several design options are possible as
to the decision-making regarding the entry of new partici-
pants. In the Broodfonds example, the members of the pool
must agree unanimously to include a new participant in the
pool. In this respect, an important role would be played by the
administrator of the fund (usually a broker).
D. Contribution of Each Participant
The most standard form of contribution is that every par-
ticipant has an equal stake. However, this provides an advan-
tage to those participants which are more likely to experience
risk and are thus incentivized to free-ride. In more complex
situations where the risk of individual participants differs, (a
mix of) other metrics can be used as a proxy for determining
the proper level of contribution, including bandwidth, turno-
ver and the average number of connected devices or data
records. In such a situation, there is a risk that larger players
will not want to participate in the pool because of the prospect
of free-riding by the smaller players, and this is especially the
case when the gap between the two groups is wide. In order to
institute optimal incentives for prevention, it may be clear that
the contribution should, in principle, be risk-related. “Good”
risks should therefore contribute less than bad risks do. This
risk differentiation, as reflected in the financial contribution,
will provide incentives for prevention. The reverse would be
the case in the absence of risk differentiation, in which case a
flat fee contribution would be charged. Such a flat fee would
invite free-riding as it would not provide any rewards for invest-
ing in additional safety measures. Most existing risk sharing
agreements (including the P&I clubs) should therefore im-
pose minimum safety rules on the one hand, and differentiate
financial contributions according to risk on the other. In or-
der to provide adequate incentives for prevention, the latter
approach should also be used for cyber security risks. Mini-
mum ex ante safety rules could for instance be determined
through the International Organization for Standardization
and International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC)
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27002 and the Centre for Internet Security’s (CIS) Critical Se-
curity Controls.
E. Timing of the Contribution
There are various ways to fund a pool. Buhlmann and Jew-
ell distinguish three types of risks pools.131
1. Paying Ex Ante
By paying a premium ex ante, all participants pay a peri-
odic fee. For example, the members of the Broodfonds pay a
monthly premium to each Broodfond’s bank account. The
major advantage of requiring up-front payment is that the will-
ingness of all participants in the pool to contribute to the pool
will be higher ex ante, when they do not know who will be vic-
timized by the cyber security risk and the decision is being
taken “behind the veil of ignorance.” It avoids the problem of
hindsight bias, which creates a reduced willingness to contrib-
ute ex post on the part of members who were not ultimately
victimized. However, the disadvantage of an ex ante payment is
that it leads to an immobilization of capital.
2. Paying Ex Post
Paying ex post means that participants in the pool solely
pool the risk, and then pay per claim ex post.132 The advantage
of this system is that members retain liquidity and there is no
welfare loss caused by “dead” money. However, uncertainty is
increased since members cannot be sure that the other mem-
bers will pay. A possible means of avoiding this uncertainty is
through a bank guarantee, as is used in a European system to
cover pollution damage for offshore oil and gas installations
known as the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL).
OPOL guarantees that specific funds will be made available to
meet the claims by having its members provide proof of finan-
cial wherewithal. OPOL provides de facto mutual risk sharing
as far as the insolvency of one of its members is concerned. For
that reason the solvency of the members is controlled since
131. Buhlmann & Jewell, supra note 50.
132. This is called a claims pool. See id.
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operators have different ways of demonstrating financial
wherewithal.133
3. Hybrid Payment
In the case of ex ante payment, the claims could exceed
the accumulated funds. In such a situation, a hybrid frame-
work—a combination of prepaid premium and retroactive div-
idend—is one solution.134 In practice, many existing risk shar-
ing agreements use a hybrid model. For example, the P&I
clubs discussed above will, in principle, demand an upfront
payment from their members. When a “good” year (one with
few or no losses) occurs, the club could decide not to require a
contribution for the following year. Conversely, during an es-
pecially “bad” year (with relatively large incidents of damage)
a request for additional funds can be made of the members.135
CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the potential for, and condi-
tions precedent to, using risk pooling as a tool to deal with
cyber security risk. Risk pooling has often emerged as an alter-
native to insurance for newly emerging risks. With newly
emerging risks, statistical information which would allow an
accurate pricing of the risk is often unavailable, and the ensu-
ing insurer ambiguity may lead to high risk premiums as a re-
sult of which there may be insufficient demand. The basic idea
with risk pooling is that when it comes to particular risks, oper-
ators may have better information than insurers on both the
risk exposure and on the optimal preventive measures to be
taken. When this is the case, a pool can lead to mutual moni-
toring, which serves to stimulate 1) information exchange, 2) a
reduction of transaction costs, and 3) ex ante prevention of
risks. We posited that if these conditions are present, risk pool-
ing may create protection not only for individual operators
who participate in the pool, but also positive externalities for
133. For details see Michael Faure & Hui Wang, Compensating Victims of a
European Deepwater Horizon Accident: OPOL Revisited, 62 MARINE POL’Y 25
(2015).
134. Marshall, supra note 60.
135. See Michael Faure, In the Aftermath of the Disaster: Liability and Compen-
sation Mechanisms as Tools to Reduce Disaster Risks, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 95,
155–57 (2016).
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society at large, since the pool can contribute to the general
reduction of cyber security risks.
The main advantage of risk pooling is that it can provide
coverage even when the specific probabilities of an incident
occurring remain hard to predict. Whereas insurance always
requires the setting of a premium, pooling is possible without
a specific pricing of the risk. It is necessary, however, to iden-
tify the relative contribution of the various participants to the
pool.
Based on these general starting points we examined the
potential of risk pooling in the cyber security context. We ar-
gue that if sufficient information can be gathered by operators
to enable differentiation of the relative risk exposure for, and
contribution of, the various participants, then the traditional
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (which both
threaten the emergence of risk pooling) can be remedied. We
also noticed that the major advantage of cyber risk pooling pri-
marily lies not in compensation ex post (for which insurance is
often used), but rather in the information exchange that may
be generated through the creation of a pool.
Referring to examples of both viable and failed risk pools,
we pointed at the importance of implementing a careful de-
sign for the cyber risk pool. To the best of our knowledge,
cyber risk pooling has not yet emerged. However, we argue
that there may be strong incentives among operators to create
such pools, not so much as tools for ex post compensation, but
as tools for information exchange which can produce ex ante
reduction of cyber security risks. The emergence of a risk pool,
however, requires both a somewhat accurate understanding
on the part of operators of the cyber security risk at issue, as
well as a degree of similarity (perhaps even homogeneity)
among the risks faced, in order to facilitate the risk pooling. It
also will most likely require an active entrepreneur like a bro-
ker to initiate the pool. Moreover, risk pooling would never be
the only instrument used to deal with cyber security, both from
a prevention standpoint as well as from a compensation per-
spective. With respect to compensation, a pool would likely in-
clude a large deductible, which would mean that operators
would still individually manage risks below the deductible, and
in doing so, reduce moral hazard. Moreover, pools usually in-
clude important limits—very high, catastrophic risks are often
hedged to (re)insurers. It is therefore likely that in the future,
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cyber risk pooling may come to take an important place in
multi-layered compensation mechanisms for dealing with
cyber security risk.
The goal of our paper was merely to postulate that risk
pooling could play an important role in cyber security and to
show the specific conditions and design issues that would have
to be taken into account in developing cyber risk pooling. Of
course, the specific nature of the cyber security risk, as well as
the wide variety of cyber risks, deserve further attention. The
results of such research may ultimately warrant the conclusion
that various risk pools will be required for specific types of
cyber security risks. Both the finding of a means to design such
a system in a more detailed manner, as well as the interest of
operators in participation in such a pool, are issues that un-
doubtedly merit further research.
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